The attack on 23 October in Trappes and La Verrière put racist violence back at the centre of public debate. But what exactly does the term “far-right terrorism” cover? Europol’s latest overview provides figures, while also highlighting their limitations.
Five attacks classified as far-right in 2025
In its 2026 report on the situation and trends in terrorism in the European Union, Europol records 45 terrorist attacks committed, attempted or foiled in 2025. Five were classified as far-right terrorism: one attack carried out in France, which left one person dead, and four plots foiled, three in France and one in Ireland.
The authorities in member states also reported 43 arrests linked to this movement in nine countries. Germany and the Netherlands recorded eight each; France and Belgium, five each. The most frequent grounds were incitement or threats, membership of an organisation and preparation of an attack.
These figures describe a worrying reality, but they are not a perfect barometer. Europol stresses one methodological point: each country submits its data under its own national law. The same act may therefore be classified differently from one country to another. Incidents involving violent extremism that are not classified as terrorism are also analysed in the report, but are not included in the total number of attacks.
Lone actors, rarely cut off from all networks
Europol’s portrait is not one of a single organisation with a chain of command. Perpetrators are most often individuals acting alone or small cells, with no formal links to an organisation. Yet they are not necessarily isolated: many frequent online communities, share propaganda and move between several violent subcultures.
This porosity makes the phenomenon harder to understand. Neo-Nazi, supremacist or antisemitic references can mix with accelerationism — the idea of hastening society’s collapse —, violent nihilism or imagery borrowed from other extremist milieus. Ideological allegiance is not always coherent. Among some young suspects, Europol observes instead fragmented consumption of violent content and rapid online radicalisation.
The five attacks recorded in 2025 involved bladed weapons, firearms or improvised explosive devices. Targets mentioned in the report include places of worship, religious communities, centres for asylum seekers, ethnic minorities and political opponents perceived as such.
Why the threat extends beyond national borders
The digital environment gives these movements a transnational reach, even when the groups remain small. Networks such as The Base have cells in several countries; according to Europol, this neo-Nazi and accelerationist organisation is the only far-right group on the European Union’s list of counter-terrorism sanctions. Other groupings are more informal: the “Active Clubs”, for example, form a decentralised network present in several states, although not every gym or association using that name is necessarily linked to extremism.
A study by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism published in June 2026 notes that 17 European countries, including the United Kingdom, have banned at least one far-right organisation since 2000. The number of countries to have taken such a measure has increased over the past five years. The study also highlights the limitations of bans: groups can move their activities online or to a country where legal pressure is lower.
The phenomenon is therefore transnational, but that is not enough to measure a uniform “global threat”. Europol’s report covers the European Union, not the entire world. It documents the movement of people, propaganda and methods between countries; it does not provide a comparable global tally.
What the Trappes case changes in the debate
The France Culture programme International Issues, broadcast on 26 October, takes the attack on 23 October in Trappes and La Verrière as its starting point to examine this international dimension. However, the shift from a racist act to a terrorist classification is neither automatic nor purely rhetorical: it depends on the investigation, the motive established and the legal framework applied.
This distinction also matters for public debate. Not every act of racist violence is legally a terrorist act; conversely, limiting the focus to counter-terrorism proceedings alone would obscure some of the violence and networks that fuel the threat.
European data thus lead to a less dramatic, but more precise, conclusion: the number of attacks classified in this category remains low compared with all the terrorism recorded in the Union, while networks, content and radicalisation pathways are more diffuse. Tracking only attacks carried out would mean overlooking foiled plots, arrests and the online spaces where attacks are sometimes prepared.
