A council replaced by loyalists, opponents dispersed, resources seized: these mechanisms of power can be traced in the archives of the Batavia, wrecked in 1629. A management study published in September 2026 draws parallels with the behaviour of destructive leaders. The comparison merits examination, provided a historical tragedy is not turned into a test for diagnosing its leader.
A shipwreck, followed by a seizure of power
The Batavia belonged to the Dutch East India Company, the VOC. On 4 June 1629, it struck a reef in the Houtman Abrolhos Islands, off Western Australia. Survivors made their way to nearby islands. Commander Francisco Pelsaert and Captain Ariaen Jacobsz set off to look for water, then for help from Batavia, present-day Jakarta.
Jeronimus Cornelisz, a junior merchant with the company, then imposed his authority. The Western Australian Museum describes plans for a mutiny before the shipwreck and, afterwards, a strategy of division that led to the murder of more than one hundred people. A group sent to another island found enough to survive; led by the soldier Wiebbe Hayes, it resisted the mutineers and captured Cornelisz.
These details are part of the documented history of the shipwreck. They do not depend on the psychological vocabulary used today to interpret them. The museum also recalls the shortage of water and food on some of the islands: material control of resources was part of the situation of domination. Historical account from the Western Australian Museum.
What the study actually proposes
Clive Roland Boddy, a researcher at Anglia Ruskin University, revisits this history through the theory of corporate psychopathy. His article, published on 9 September 2026 in the Asian Journal of Business Ethics, draws in particular on the work of historian Mike Dash and on historical documents. It compares the actions attributed to Cornelisz with characteristics described in this literature.
The replacement of council members with accomplices is central to the analysis. A body that could oversee the leader becomes a circle of personal supporters. Boddy also examines the sidelining of rivals, pledges of allegiance and the use of fear. In his interpretation, Cornelisz could be one of the earliest identifiable cases of this type of leader in a multinational company owned by shareholders.
The conditional matters. The researcher does not present an exhaustive survey of all business leaders who lived before 1629. His article states that no new dataset was produced or analysed. It is an interpretative historical study, not a clinical examination of the individual. Article by Clive Roland Boddy.
A useful comparison, if it focuses on mechanisms
To say that a contemporary leader is like Cornelisz because they impose a decision would be a shortcut. The episode involved murderous violence, extreme isolation and a colonial context. The differences from a present-day company are considerable. Erasing them would make the comparison sensational, but not very illuminating.
The comparison becomes more fruitful when it concerns checks and balances. Who can challenge a decision? Do those responsible for oversight have real autonomy? Can adverse information be passed up the chain without the person who reports it being sidelined? These questions concern how an organisation works; they do not require us to guess at the inner personality of the person in charge.
Take a hypothetical example: in a team, a target changes every week, but the same employees are consistently blamed for delays. The first step is to reconstruct the instructions, resources and deadlines. A psychological label alone will not explain what was supposed to be done or why it becomes impossible.
This does not excuse abusive behaviour. It avoids confusing analysis of the facts with a single explanation centred on a presumed character trait. An organisation can also allow problems to persist because no one knows whom to report them to, or because decisions are never reviewed.
To take action, return to the reality of the work
In its approach to preventing psychosocial risks, INRS favours a collective process focused on work situations and how work is organised. The French institute recommends identifying risk factors, developing measures and monitoring their effects. It stresses the importance of protecting employees’ ability to speak up and ensuring that the diagnosis leads to concrete action.
Its approach distinguishes analysis of organisational causes from any investigation of responsibility. In particular, it encourages clarifying roles, matching demands to resources and involving employees in changes that affect them. These methodological guidelines do not replace the procedures applicable in each country or the support suited to an individual situation. INRS guidance on preventing psychosocial risks.
The question to ask after a warning, then, is not just ‘what is the leader’s personality like?’ It is also: what facts can be established, what decision needs to change, and how can we check that the change is actually protecting people? A listening process that has no consequences for the work leaves that last question unanswered.
The Batavia case draws attention because it is so extreme. For working life today, its value lies above all in shifting our perspective: observing the concentration of power and the disappearance of opportunities to challenge it, rather than looking to a story from four centuries ago for a list of symptoms to apply to our colleagues.
